Patent Litigation After the Teva Pharmaceuticals Decision: Progression Through Judicial and Economic Efficiency by Kalinowski, Richard J
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2017
Patent Litigation After the Teva Pharmaceuticals
Decision: Progression Through Judicial and
Economic Efficiency
Richard J. Kalinowski
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kalinowski, Richard J., "Patent Litigation After the Teva Pharmaceuticals Decision: Progression Through Judicial and Economic
Efficiency" (2017). Law School Student Scholarship. 887.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/887
  1 
 
Patent Litigation After the Teva Pharmaceuticals Decision: 
Progression Through Judicial and Economic Efficiency 
                 Rick Kalinowski1  
 
Part I: Introduction 
 Our forefathers understood that if our country was to prosper, we must “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”2  Over the years, the law has evolved 
to protect these ideals.3   Today, an invention (or patent) must meet two requirements to pass legal 
muster.4  It must contain a “specification describing the invention ‘in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same.’”5  A patent 
must also contain “one or more ‘claims,’ which ‘particularly poin[t] out and distinctly clai[m] the 
subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”6   
                                                          
1 J.D. candidate, expected 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S. 2008 Civil Engineering, B.S. 2011 
Architectural Engineering, Drexel University.  I would like to thank all of my intellectual property professors for 
unveiling my hidden passion. 
2 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
3 See generally John White, The Day that Changed the World: April 10, 1790, April 9, 2015, 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/09/the-day-that-changed-the-world-april-10-1790/id=56422/ (“[P]atents had, 
until then, been primarily the province of crony capitalism and scientific peers…The U.S. patent law changed the 
basic underpinnings of previously existing patent systems.  It was cheap and wide open.”); Digital Law Online, 
Chapter 4: An Overview of Patents (last visited January 23, 2016), http://digital-law-
online.info/lpdi1.0/treatise52.html (“Instead of examining a patent application to determine whether the invention met 
the requirements of the Act, it was up to the courts to declare a patent invalid if it lacked novelty or was not properly 
described in the application.”); Laws, The Patent Fire of 1836, http://patent.laws.com/patent-act-of-1836/patent-act-
of-1836-patent-fire-of-1836 (“One of the most important legacies of the Patent Act of 1836 was its creation of the first 
USA Patent Office.”); The Antitrust Laws, Federal Trade Commission, (last visited January 23, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (“Yet for over 100 years, 
the antitrust laws have had the same basic objective: to protect the process of competition for the benefit of consumers, 
making sure there are strong incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep prices down, and keep quality up.”); 
Laws, Patent Act of 1952, http://patent.laws.com/patent-act-of-1952/patent-act-of-1952 (“[E]ven if the Patent Act of 
1952 had not altered any specific detail of American patent law, it would have still been significant simply by placing 
all of these details in the same place.  As it is today, Federal law on patents are grouped into three main categories.”); 
Summary of the America Invents Act, American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), 
http://www.aipla.org/advocacy/congress/aia/Pages/summary.aspx (“[T]he U.S. transitions from a First to Invent 
patent system to a system where priority is given to the first inventor to file a patent application.”). 
4 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996). 
5 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
6 Id. 
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 In today’s legal system, patent litigation heavily revolves around an invention’s claims.7  
In many cases, patent litigation rises and falls on the issue of claim construction.8  Claim 
construction gives meaning to the claimed invention; in other words, how someone should 
construe the claims of a patent to determine their meaning.9  A court’s decision regarding the 
contents of a claim is vital to determining if a patent claim is invalid or if another patent claim is 
infringing.10  In one of the most important patent law cases, Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc., the United States Supreme Court held “that claim construction is a matter of law to be 
determined exclusively by the judge.”11  The Supreme Court further noted that “[b]ecause claim 
construction is a matter of law, the construction given the claims is reviewed de novo on appeal.”12  
De novo review allows a reviewing court to determine an issue anew, so that the court views the 
matter from the same point of view as the district court with no need to give a previous 
determination any weight or deference.13  However, the Supreme Court has recently held that a 
“clearly erroneous” standard of review should have applied to the district court’s resolution of an 
underlying factual dispute in the construction of a patent claim.14   
 This note will argue that patent litigation following the Teva decision will change in two 
ways: (i) the heightened review standard will lead to an increase in settlements and dropped 
                                                          
7 Soonwoo Hong, Claiming what Counts in Business: Drafting Patent Claims with a Clear Business Purpose, World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/drafting_patent_claims_fulltext.html (“Claim construction is very important 
in patent litigation because it is the basis for determining whether the patent is invalid for failing to meet the conditions 
and requirements of patentability or to determine whether the patent is infringed.”). 
8 Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a Consistent 
Claim Construction Methodology, Journal of Intellectual Property Law, 8 J. Intell. Prop. L. 175, 191 (2001) (“Claim 
construction issues have become, and will continue to be , a critical issue in patent infringement law, in part, because 
of the explosion of patent litigation and the new corporate attitude toward patents.”). 
9 http://www.jurisdiction.com/patweb04.pdf 
10 Id. 
11 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
12 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
13 See Lawrence v. Dep’t of Interior, 525 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Lewis v. United States, 641 F.3d 
1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011). 
14 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 843 (2015). 
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lawsuits, which affects judicial efficiency; and (ii) the increase in settlements and dropped lawsuits 
will reduce the economic burden on the parties involved in litigation.  Part II of this note will 
discuss the history of patent claim construction, the reasoning behind de novo review versus a clear 
error standard, the development of the Markman Hearing and the difference between intrinsic and 
extrinsic evidence.  Part III of this note will analyze the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., the economic ramifications from this decision and its potential 
impact on judicial efficiency.   Finally, Part III of this note will also examine how courts have 
ruled on patent claim construction issues in cases following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Teva.  
Part II: Evolution of Patent Litigation  
A. History of Claim Construction 
 Since the first patent acts were introduced over two centuries ago, an inventor has been 
required to describe the invention with enough particularity “as not only to distinguish the 
invention or discovery from other things before known and used, but also to enable a workman . . 
. to make, construct, and use the same.”15  This requirement has evolved through subsequent Acts 
and now patent specifications must contain claims that particularly point out what the inventor 
believes to be his or her invention.16 
 The majority of patent litigation revolves around the interpretation of claim language.  It is 
a fundamental principal that when litigation deals with claim construction, understanding the claim 
“begins with, and remains focused on, the language of the claims.”17  The importance of claim 
construction cannot be emphasized enough.  In order for a patent to be infringed upon, the patent’s 
                                                          
15 Act of April 10, 1790, Chapter 7, Section 2, Stat. 109. 
16 See Kirk M. Hartung, Claim Construction: Another Matter of Chance and Confusion, 88 J.Pat & Trademark Off. 
Soc’y 831, 832 (2006). 
17 Biagro Western Sales, Inc. v. Grow More, Inc., 423 F.3d 1296, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2005) citing Innova/Pure Water, 
Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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claim must incorporate the allegedly infringing invention.18  Therefore, determining the meaning 
of language contained in a patent’s claim is paramount to deciding if another invention is 
infringing.19 
 Claim construction is the most important part of patent litigation because the parties will 
typically disagree on what certain claim terms mean.20  Furthermore, the dispute over claim terms 
revolves around the meaning of those terms at the time of the invention itself, not as of the date 
when the Markman Hearing is being held.21  There are two reasons why the interpretation of the 
claim language is important: (1) there can be numerous variations to how a word in a claim is 
interpreted and (2) when drafting a claim, a patent applicant may choose to be their own 
lexicographer.22  What a term means today may differ from its definition years ago because 
language evolves.23  An applicant can pick and choose what meanings attach to various terms “or 
nudge the language toward a new one by striking out on their own.”24  In other words, the terms 
and the meaning of those terms should be defined within the claim application itself or as Judge 
Giles S. Rich concisely explained “the name of the game is the claim.”25      
 The construction of a patent claim is too vital to allow its determination to be subjective.  
And because an appellate court may have a different understanding of a claim term from that of 
the district court, reversal rates of claim construction decisions are astoundingly high.26  Roughly 
                                                          
18 See H. Schwartz, Patent Law and Practice 1, 33 (2d ed. 1995). 
19 Id. 
20 See generally, J. Jonas Anderson, Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative 
Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 21 (2013). 
21 See Laura Mullendore, Patent Claim Construction: A Sliding-Scale Standard of Review, 28 Rev. Litig. 241 
(2008). 
22 See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
23 See Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 876 F.2d 599, 600 (7th Cir. 1989). 
24 Id. 
25 See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 101, 102 (2005) citing 
Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims – American Perspectives, 21 Int’l Rev. Indus. Prop. 
& Copyright L. 497, 499 (1990).  
26 See generally, Richard S. Gruner, How High Is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources and Meaning of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 981 (2010). 
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one in every three claim construction rulings are reversed by the Federal Circuit.27  Unfortunately, 
this creates an issue of judicial efficiency and the credibility of district court judges.28 
B. De Novo versus Clear Error Review 
 Once a judicial determination has been made it can be classified as either a question of law, 
question of fact, or a matter of discretion.29  These determinations are reviewed, de novo, for clear 
error, or for abuse of discretion, respectively.30  For the purposes of this note, only de novo and 
clear error review will be discussed.  Courts have established that de novo review “means that th[e] 
court views the case from the same position as the district court [and] . . . [t]he appellate court 
must consider the matter anew, as if no decision previously had been rendered.”31  On the other 
hand, “[f]indings of fact are made on the basis of evidentiary hearings and usually involve 
credibility determinations, which explains why they are reviewed deferentially under the clearly 
erroneous standard.”32  
 This is a critically important distinction that appeals to common sense.  If the issue before 
a reviewing court is one of law, then the judges are equally capable of making their own 
interpretations or determinations without relying on what the district court decided.  On the 
contrary, if the issue is a question of fact, judges reviewing the cold record transcripts do not have 
                                                          
27 Id. at 995 (“Case reversal rates due to Federal Circuit claim construction revisions have been measured at 27% to 
40% in studies encompassing regular Federal Circuit opinions and summary affirmances under Rule 36 and at even 
higher reversal rates of 41% to 53.5% in studies that ignored these summary affirmances.”). 
28 Id. at 1001. 
29 See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[D]ecisions by judges are traditionally divided into 
three categories, denominated questions of law (reviewable de novo), questions of fact (reviewable for clear error), 
and matters of discretion (reviewable for abuse of discretion).” (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
30 Id. 
31 Cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/guides/stand_of_review/I_Definitions.html, citing Lawrence v. Dep’t of 
Interior, 525 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2008); Lewis v. United States, 641 F.3d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011); Freeman v. 
DirecTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 2006). 
32 Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
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the advantage of hearing the evidence first hand.33  An essential component of determining the 
credibility of evidence is being able to see and hear the demeanor of the person presenting it.34 
C. The Creation of the Markman Hearing: Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 
 One, if not the, most precedential decisions in patent litigation is Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, which was delivered by the Supreme Court in 1996.35  In Markman, the issue was 
whether interpretation of a patent claim “is a matter of law reserved entirely for the court,”36 or for 
a jury to “determine the meaning of any disputed term of art about which expert testimony is 
offered.”37  The Petitioner had patented a “system that can monitor and report the status, location, 
and movement of clothing in a dry-cleaning establishment.”38  Respondent’s product functioned 
similarly, in that it could “record an inventory of receivables by tracking invoices and transaction 
totals.”39  The lawsuit boiled down to “the meaning of the word ‘inventory,’ a term found in 
Markman’s independent claim.”40 The jury viewed the Respondent’s product as an infringement 
on Markman’s claim, however, the district court granted Respondent’s motion for judgment as a 
matter of law because it was not capable of the same operations as Markman’s invention.41  On 
                                                          
33 David Krinsky, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, and the Role of Appellate Deference in Patent Claim 
Construction Appeals, 66 Md. L. Rev. 194, 199 (2006) (“Thus, when trial judges have heard testimony intended to 
put them in the position of one skilled in the art, the Federal Circuit should grant deference to the decisions the trial 
judge makes about how particular technical claim terms are understood by practitioners of the art.”). 
34 Hon. John J. DiMotto, Determining Credibility of Witnesses and the Weight of Evidence, April 3, 2015, 
http://johndimotto.blogspot.com/2015/04/determining-credibility-of-witnesses.html, citing Covelli v. Covelli, 293 
Wis.2d 707 (Ct. App. 2006) (“the credibility and weight determination is uniquely in the province of the fact finder 
because it is in a better position than an appellate court to make such determinations.  The fact finder has a superior 
view of the total circumstances of the witness’ testimony.”). 
35 Andrew Y. Piatnicia, The Road to a Successful Markman Hearing, Law360, (May 22, 2008, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/57110/the-road-to-a-successful-markman-hearing.  
36 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 374. 
39 Id. at 375. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
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appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court, and held that “the interpretation of claim 
terms [is] the exclusive province of the court.”42 
 The Supreme Court opined that a basic, bare bones patent case involves two distinct 
elements: (1) construing the patent language; and (2) evaluating if there was infringement.43  
Construing the patent language is a question of law for the court, while the infringement evaluation 
is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.44  The Supreme Court elaborated on the issue, 
positing that if a term of art is necessary in comprehending a patent’s claims are outside a judge’s 
requisite knowledge, expert witnesses and other means may be used for clarification.45  However, 
it remains the responsibility of the court to provide “the patent its true and final character and 
force.”46  Sometimes, whether an issue is fact or law is not so black and white.  Sometimes, an 
important issue falls somewhere in the grey area “between a pristine legal standard and a simple 
historical fact.”47  In this situation, courts have continually held that a judge, not a jury, is the more 
appropriate judicial actor to decide on the issue.48  For these reasons, the Supreme Court held that 
“the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the 
province of the court.”49   
 Importantly, the Supreme Court found “sufficient reason to treat construction of terms of 
art like many other responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the normal course of trial, 
notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings.”50  While the question of whether claim 
                                                          
42 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996). 
43 See Id. at 384. 
44 See Id. citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 338 (1853); see also, Winans v. New York & E. R. Co., 62 U.S. 
88, 100 (1858). 
45 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 387-8. See also, A. Walker, Patent Law, 173 (3d ed. 1895); W. Robinson, Law of Patents, 
481-483 (1890). 
46 Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 citing W. Robinson, Law of Patents, 481-483 (1890). 
47 Markman at 388 citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985). 
48 See Markman, at 388; Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (No. 10,740) (CC ED Pa. 1849). 
49 Id. at 372. 
50 Markman, at 390 (emphasis added). 
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construction was a question of fact or law was not answered, the Supreme Court ruled “that courts 
are better suited than juries for determining the subsidiary question of claim construction and set 
the job squarely on the shoulders of the judges.”51  Since 1996, courts have been conducting 
Markman Hearings at different times during the litigation process.  During a Markman Hearing, 
the judge determines what the disputed terms of a patent claim mean.52  Markman Hearings have 
become nearly as critical in the procedural process as the trial itself and has been “a party’s key 
opportunity to assist the judge with his or her task and to guide the judge through the evidence in 
a credible and convincing manner.”53  
Since the time of the Markman decision, the breadth of what is decided in a Markman 
Hearing has been evolving54 and at what point in the litigation process should a Markman Hearing 
be held?55  Some jurisdictions leave the timing of the Markman Hearing entirely “[s]ubject to the 
convenience of the Court’s calendar.”56  However, the majority of jurisdictions schedule a 
Markman Hearing between two weeks and two months from the submission of reply briefs.57  And 
although some jurisdictions allow the Markman Hearing to be held at the convenience of the court, 
after the claim is fully briefed and before the trial begins is the most advantageous timeframe.58  
                                                          
51 Vincent P. Kovalick, Markman Hearings and Their Critical Role in U.S. Patent Litigation, Finnegan, (October 
2009), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=9a8bf39b-c419-4329-9f6a-
08ac0a647c7c.  
52 Patent Tips, http://www.markmanhearing.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
53 Kovalick, supra note 46. 
54 See Robert C. Weiss, Todd R. Miller, Practical Tips on Enforcing and Defending Patents, 85 J. Pat. & Trademark 
Off. Soc’y 791, 827 (2003). 
55 Kovalick, supra note 46; see generally, Craig Metcalf, Deconstructing patent claim construction hearings, Inside 
Counsel, (August 6, 2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/08/06/deconstructing-patent-claim-construction-
hearings; see also, William F. Lee, Anita K. Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman: A Prescription for the Timing of 
Claim Construction Hearings, 13 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 55, 56 (1999). 
56 Local Patent Rules: Patent Rules Made Easy, www.localpatentrules.com/compare-rules/markman-hearing/ 
(November 2015) (Georgia Northern: “Subject to the convenience of the Court’s calendar, the Court shall conduct a 
Claim Construction Hearing to the extent the Court believe a hearing is necessary for construction of the claims at 
issue.”). 
57 See Local Patent Rules: Patent Rules Made Easy. 
58 Edward Brunet, MARKMAN HEARINGS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION, Lewis and 
Clark Law Review 95-6 (“This preference mirrored a 2002 ABA survey, which found that claim construction hearings 
were held after discovery but before trial in seventy-eight percent of the cases studied.”) 
  9 
 
This allows both parties to better understand their chances of success at trial by establishing the 
meaning of terms, which may be crucial to the outcome of the case.59 
Some parties want to hold the Markman Hearing as early as possible, in order to give them 
a clear roadmap for the upcoming trial or even to induce a settlement.60  However, if discovery has 
not progressed sufficiently, a full and precise interpretation of the claim at the Markman Hearing 
may not be possible.61 For that reason, conducting the Markman Hearing close to the end of 
discovery but well before trial begins is the most advantageous timeframe.62  This allows the 
Markman Hearing results to be utilized as a tool by both parties; it can bolster an argument, change 
the point of attack, or lead to a settlement with the incredible expense of trial looming.63 
Markman Hearings can last longer than trial itself.64  The lengthy process is due to the 
voluminous evidence collected from both parties and disputes can arise over any number of 
specific facts in that evidence.65  In the next section, the differences between intrinsic and extrinsic 
evidence will be elaborated on because the distinction is important.  Ideally, the court should hold 
an initial Markman Hearing and accept only intrinsic evidence.66  If any ambiguity of the relevant 
claim terms exists within the intrinsic evidence then an additional Markman Hearing should be 
held with the introduction of extrinsic evidence.67  Introducing this extrinsic evidence is key to 
                                                          
59 Id. at 96 (“The presence of full discovery ensures that the claim construction ruling will be made on a complete 
record, with correspondingly less possibility of reversal by the Federal Circuit.”)  
60 Craig Metcalf, Deconstructing patent claim construction hearings, Inside Counsel, (August 6, 2014), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/08/06/deconstructing-patent-claim-construction-hearings.  
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
63 See Id.  
64 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
65 See Id. (“parties battle over experts offering conflicting evidence regarding who qualifies as one of ordinary skill 
in the art; the meaning of patent terms to that person; the state of the art at the time of the invention; contradictory 
dictionary definitions and which would be consulted by the skilled artisan; the scope of specialized terms; the 
problem a patent was solving; what is related or pertinent art; whether a construction was disallowed during 
prosecution; how one of skill in the art would understand statements during prosecution; and on and on.”). 
66 Timing is Everything in Patent Litigation – Fulfilling the Promise of Markman, 9 Fed. Circuit B.J. 227, 238 
(1999). 
67 See Id. 
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helping the court understand the sometimes complex technical language found within patent 
claims.68  Not allowing the litigants the opportunity to present this evidence in support of their 
assertions would be the definition of injustice.69 
B. Intrinsic Evidence vs. Extrinsic Evidence 
 When a court is tasked with evaluating the construction of a claim, it has two main types 
of evidence that can be used as guidance: (1) intrinsic, which includes the patent claim language 
as well as prosecution history; and (2) extrinsic, which includes expert testimony.70  Typically, 
intrinsic evidence is the first line of proof in determining the meaning of claim language.71  When 
defining the language of a particular claim, a court initially looks at the claims themselves, the 
attached specification, and the dialogue between the patentee and the patent office.72  This is an 
intuitive system, looking at the plain language of the claim should be the initial test for 
understanding its meaning.  Especially when the “patentee may choose to be his own 
lexicographer.”73  Since the claim must contain a specific description of the invention, “it is the 
single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”74   
 As discussed earlier, both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence are brought forward during the 
Markman Hearing.  The Markman Hearing “may occur well before the trial” and the parties will 
need to “navigate tens of thousands of documents” during this process, which is only the intrinsic 
                                                          
68 See Id. 
69 See generally, supra note 66. 
70 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
71 Id. at 1576; Markman. 
72 Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“To ascertain the meaning of claims, we 
consider three sources: The claims, the specification, and the prosecution history.”) 
73 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1578 citing Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
74 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1577. 
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evidence.75  In addition, extrinsic evidence such as, inventor testimony, graphical animations, 
tutorials, and live or written expert testimony may be presented at the Markman Hearing.76 
 Claims should be read in light of the written specification of which they are a part.77  A 
written specification accompanies the claim and essentially provides a detailed explanation of the 
invention.  It must be detailed enough to allow a person with basic abilities in the specific field to 
which the invention pertains to construct and use the described invention.78  This written 
description can be used as dictionary to help define certain terms that appear in the claims.79  That 
way, if the patentee intends on giving a specific term a special meaning, that meaning “must be 
clearly defined in the specification.”80   
 Another valuable piece of intrinsic evidence used to construe claim language is the patent’s 
prosecution history, which includes the record of proceedings in the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office.81  Moreover, the language of a patent application can have a specific and overt 
meaning if the patentee uses his or her own words in the specification and claims.82  This meaning 
may be confirmed by “what the patentee said when he was making his application.”83  When 
intrinsic evidence is sufficient to understand the disputed term it is wholly unnecessary to evaluate 
any extrinsic evidence of any kind.84 
                                                          
75 Vincent P. Kovalick, Markman Hearings and Their Critical Role in U.S. Patent Litigation, 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=9a8bf39b-c419-4329-9f6a-08ac0a647c7c 
76 Kovalick, supra note 76. 
77 Autogiro Co. of Am. V. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396-98 (Ct. Cl 1967). 
78 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (“The 
specification contains a written description of the invention that must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make 
and use the invention.”). 
79 Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.  
80 Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 citing Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
81 Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966). 
82 Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 citing Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 227 (1880). 
83 Id. 
84 See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, 90 F.3d 1576, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also, Douglas Y’Barbo, Is Extrinsic 
Evidence Ever Necessary to Resolve Claim Construction Disputes?, 81 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 567, 568 
(1999). 
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 In addition to intrinsic evidence, “[e]xpert testimony, including evidence of how those 
skilled in the art would interpret the claims, may be used.”85  Any information or source outside 
of the patent and application process is considered extrinsic evidence, “including expert and 
inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.”86  Extrinsic evidence can be used to 
establish a change in a terms meaning over time, it can “show what was then old, to distinguish 
what was new, and to aid the court in the construction of the patent.”87  A court has the latitude to 
allow such evidence to be heard “to aid the court in coming to a correct conclusion” with regards 
to the “true meaning of the language employed” in a patent claim.88  However, a court should only 
consider extrinsic evidence if it is absolutely necessary to understand the meaning of technical 
terms.89 
 When a party introduces extrinsic evidence the clear error review standard is not 
automatically invoked.90  If the intrinsic evidence is sufficient to determine the scope of the terms 
in a patent claim, then even if extrinsic evidence is heard, a court may review the construction de 
novo.91  Extrinsic evidence is both appropriate and important in determining a patent claim term’s 
meaning, but intrinsic evidence will always be the most significant factor in the determination.92 
Part III: Analysis 
                                                          
85 Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 821 F.2d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
86 Markman at 980. 
87 Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 41, 23 L. Ed. 200 (1875). 
88 Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 546, 20 L. Ed. 33 (1870). 
89 Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
90 Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Teva cannot transform legal 
analysis about the meaning or significance of the intrinsic evidence into a factual question simply by having an 
expert testify on it.”). 
91 Eidos Display, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 779 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“To the extent the district 
court considered extrinsic evidence in its claim construction order or summary judgment order, that evidence is 
ultimately immaterial to the outcome because the intrinsic record is clear.”). 
92 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“while extrinsic evidence can shed useful light on 
the relevant art…it is less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of claim 
language.”) 
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A. Teva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. 
 In January of 2015, the Supreme Court issued a significant decision in Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc..  In Teva, the issue involved the construction of a claim 
with evidentiary underpinnings and how the Court of Appeals should review the lower court’s 
factfinding, either as a question of law (de novo) or question of fact (clear error).93  Teva’s patent 
covers a method of manufacturing a drug used for the treatment of multiple sclerosis and Sandoz 
attempted to sell a generic version of the drug.94  The resulting infringement case focused on the 
validity of Teva’s patent, specifically the meaning of the term “molecular weight” as they are 
contained within Teva’s patent claim.95  
 Sandoz argued that the “molecular weight” could have three different interpretations and 
therefore the claim’s language does not meet the definiteness requirement.96  The district court 
concluded, after hearing expert testimony, that a person skilled in the art would properly 
understand the meaning of “molecular weight” as it is found in Teva’s patent claim.97  The Federal 
Circuit reversed, finding Teva’s patent invalid because the “molecular weight” language was 
indefinite.98  The Federal Circuit reached this conclusion by essentially hitting the “reset” button 
on the issue and reviewed the lower court’s determination of facts for claim construction de novo.99  
 The Supreme Court explained that the ultimate question of patent claim construction is a 
legal question for the courts to decide; however, the meaning and use of technical terms within the 
patent claim may still “give rise to a factual dispute.”100  The majority opinion held that, while an 
                                                          
93 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015). 
94 Id.  
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 836. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015). 
100 See Id. at 837 citing Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-91. 
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appellate court may review the ultimate question of claim construction de novo, the district court’s 
decision on the underlying factual dispute should be afforded deference and only be overturned if 
the decision was clearly erroneous.101  The majority reasoned that because the district court 
experiences the expert testimony and documentation first hand, it is in a much better position to 
determine the credibility of the evidence and make a rational judgment.102  If the district court 
believed that a person skilled in the art would interpret the claim language in Teva’s favor, then 
the Federal Circuit should not question the judgment in the absence of clear error.103 
C. Judicial Efficiency  
 Courts have an incredible number of cases on their dockets, a number that continues to 
rise.104  The Teva decision should help increase judicial efficiency.  Prior to Teva, parties would 
go through the entire trial process and if they were dissatisfied with the outcome, they would appeal 
and try again.  Remember, the appeal would have been heard de novo with no deference to the 
findings of the district courts.105  While an adverse decision at the district court level may 
discourage some parties, a majority of litigants will appeal knowing that the case will be heard 
anew.106   
                                                          
101 Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841 citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). 
102 Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 838. 
103 Id. at 843. 
104 Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2014, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, last visited January 28, 
2016, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2014 (“Filings in the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit grew 2 percent to 1,350.”) 
105 Gene Quinn, Supreme end Federal Circuit love affair with de novo review, (January 20, 2015), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/01/20/supremes-end-federal-circuit-love-affair-with-de-novo-review/id=53873/ 
(“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has had a very long love affair with de novo review, a 
standard whereby the reviewing appellate court can simply do whatever they want without giving any deference to 
the district court judge or the jury.”). 
106 Kimberly Alderman, Chelsey Dahm, Trial attorneys need to understand appeals standards of review, Wisconsin 
Law Journal, (November 27, 2013 9:56 am), http://wislawjournal.com/2013/11/27/trial-attorneys-need-to-
understand-appeals-standards-of-review/ (“Alternatively, you could encourage your client to consider adding issues 
concerning questions of law, as the less deferential standard of review means that you client stands a better chance of 
success.”). 
  15 
 
 In the early 1990’s fewer than 1,500 patent infringement cases were filed per year.107  By 
2013, that number had skyrocketed to over 6,500 cases per year.108  In the last four years alone, 
since the America Invents Act went into effect in 2011, the number of cases per year has nearly 
doubled.109  Unfortunately, the number of courthouses and judges have not been growing at the 
same rate.  There are a total of ninety-four (94) district courts throughout the United States and 
every patent case appeal is heard by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.110  It is easy to 
see how the judicial docket can quickly develop a backlog of cases.  To complicate matters further, 
the average patent appeal may take up to 1 year to reach a decision.111 
The Supreme Court took a crucially important step towards increasing judicial efficiency 
with its holding in Teva.  Also, there are conflicting opinions on how effective the Federal Circuit 
has been in handling the administration of patent law.112 It has been nearly 20 years since the 
Markman case was decided and the Supreme Court’s decision in Teva shows just how imperative 
judicial efficiency is to all levels of the court system.  The Teva decision may not seem ground-
breaking on its face, but its effects will be felt throughout patent litigation.  This single decision 
                                                          
107 2014 Patent Litigation Study, As case volume leaps, damages continue general decline, Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
Page 5, (July 2014), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigation-
study.pdf. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 United States Courts, Court Role and Structure, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-role-and-
structure (“In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals in 
specialized cases, such as those involving patent laws, and cases decided by…the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.”). 
111 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Median Time to Disposition in Cased Terminated After 
Hearing or Submission, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics. 
112 New York City Bar, Should Patent Jurisdiction be Removed from the Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit and 
Returned to Regional Courts of Appeal, (July 2015), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072952-
SHOULDPATENTJURISDICTIONBEREMOVEDFROMTHEJURISDICTIONOFTHEFEDERALCIRCUITAND
RETURNEDTOREGIONALCOURTSOFAPPEAL.pdf (“The Patents Committee concludes that the Federal Circuit 
should maintain exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals” while “[t]he Federal Courts Committee’s report 
recommends that patent jurisdiction be returned to the regional courts.”). 
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can move the landscape of patent litigation into a more effective direction.  Prior to Teva, the 
Federal Circuit’s rule steered litigants away from pre-trial resolution.113 
By heightening the standard of review from de novo to clear error, litigants will be less 
inclined to appeal a district court’s determination of claim construction.  These determinations are 
made during the Markman Hearings.114  As discussed earlier, the Markman Hearings are typically 
held before the trial actually begins.115  This has a two-fold effect on the litigants.   
First, the parties will be deterred from appealing the outcome of a trial if that appeal is 
based upon a determination made at the Markman Hearing.  Second, and possibly more important, 
is the effect on the parties’ decision to continue with the trial itself.  When a district court 
determines the meaning of a claim term, a party may realize that their chances at trial have just 
suffered a major blow.116  Litigants may reconsider their position and may be more receptive to 
settlement offers.117  This realization may eliminate the need for a costly trial entirely.118 
 The increased standard of review will have a direct effect on two critical cogs in the judicial 
efficiency wheel: decrease the number of appeals and increase the number of settlements. 
D. Economic Concerns 
                                                          
113 Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. 
granted, judgment vacated sub nom, Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Universal Lighting Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
1173, 191 L.Ed. 2d 130 (2015) abrogated by Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) (“creates 
greater incentives for losing parties to appeal, thus discouraging settlements and increasing the length and cost of 
litigation.”). 
114 See A Project of the Sedona Conference® Working Group on Markman Hearing & Claim et.al., The Sedona 
Conference® Report on the Markman Process, 7 Sedona Conf. J. 205 (2006). 
115 Kovalick, supra note 76. 
116 See Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Intellectual Property Law Alert – Supreme Court Alters The Standard of Review for 
Patent Claim Construction, (January 21, 2015), http://www.btlaw.com/intellectual-property-law-alert---supreme-
court-alters-the-standard-of-review-for-patent-claim-construction-01-21-2015/ (“Any underlying factual 
determinations based on extrinsic evidence will be reviewed for clear error, a very difficult standard to meet.”). 
117 See Hon. James Ware (Ret.), The New “Clear Error” Standard of Review in Patent Infringement Mediation, JAMS 
Vol. I, Spring 2015,  http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/IP-DR-
Review/JAMS_IP_DR_Review_2015_Spring.pdf (“Given the deferntial nature of the “clear error” standard, during 
mediation, parties might be influenced to be less sanguine about the prospect of a reversal on appeal and more willing 
to recognize the risk of an adverse outcome.  A successful mediation replaces the uncertainties of litigation with the 
sureties of a negotiated settlement.”). 
118 See Id. 
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 The patent litigation process is intricate, time consuming, and difficult.119  “[T]he 
probability that a patent will be involved in litigation within four years of its issuance is surging – 
more than double what it was in 1984.”120  In 2014, three of the top patent infringement verdicts 
totaled over $1 billion.121  However, the celebration is short lived because “[t]he winning parties . 
. . now have a gauntlet they have to run at the Federal Circuit before they can hope to get the 
amount awarded in district court.”122  Patent cases usually involve copious amounts of detail, so 
all parties involved in the case spend a tremendous amount of time and money reviewing and 
analyzing all of the various information.123  That is why “[o]ne third of patent cases take more than 
three years to reach trial from the time the patent owner’s complaint was filed, and more than one 
in every ten patent infringement cases takes longer than five years to reach the trial stage.”124 
 As mentioned above, patent infringement awards can be immense.125  According to the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association, the average cost of a patent infringement suit is 
as follows:  
Patent Infringement Suits (All Varieties) 
Lawsuit Value End of Discovery Final Disposition Mediation 
< $1 Million $400,000 $600,000 $100,000 
                                                          
119 Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
120 Jonathan L. Moore, Particularizing Patent Pleading: Pleading Patent Infringement in a Post-Twombly World, 18 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 451, 458-59 (quoting James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, 
Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators At Risk, 129, 129 fig. 6.3 (2008)).  
121 See Ryan Davis, Top IP Awards of 2014 – And The Firms That Won Them, (Feb. 13, 2015, 7:53 p.m.), 
www.law360.com/articles/621084/top-ip-awards-of-2014-and-the-firms-that-won-them (Feb. 13, 2015, 7:53 PM 
ET); see also, Masimo Corp. v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 2014 WL 5456890 (D. Del.); Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. 
Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 807 F.3d 1283, 1288 (Fed. Cir.) reh’g en banc denied in part, 805 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
122 Id. 
123 Hana Oh Chen, Combating Baseless Patent Suits: Rule 11 Sanctions with Technology-Specific Application, 54 
Jurimetrics J. 135, 144 (2014). 
124 Damon C. Andrews, Why Patentees Litigate, 12 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 219, 229 (2011). 
125 Davis, supra note 107. 
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$1 Million - $10 
Million 
$950,000 $2 Million $200,000 
$10 Million - $25 
Million 
$1.9 Million $3.1 Million $250,000 
> $25 Million $3 Million $5 Million $300,000 
126 
 These values listed above are staggering and have an enormous effect on Patent Assertion 
Entities (PAE), otherwise known as “patent trolls.”127  A PAE “is an entity that acquires and asserts 
patents in order to extract licensing fees without concern for whether the patented material is 
manufactured or practiced.”128  Patent trolls are successful because the threat of the economic 
burden of a patent suit typically induces adverse parties to agree to a licensing deal.129  The 
deferential standard of review will reduce the bite of patent trolls bark, which will allow true 
innovators to not be afraid to create inventions that are closely related to patents held by these 
trolls.     
 While these values are merely averages, they point to a valid conclusion - mediation is a 
bargain.  If clients know they could reduce their litigation cost by such drastic amounts, it is a 
                                                          
126 See AIPLA, 2015 Report of the Economic Survey, www.aipla.org, (June 2015), 
files.ctctcdn.com/e79ee274201/b6ced6c3-d1ee-4ee7-9873-352dbe08d8fd.pdf.  
127 Matthew Duescher, Controlling the Patent Trolls: A Proposed Approach for Curbing Abusive Section 337 Claims 
in the ITC, 96 J. Pat & Trademark Off. Soc’y 614 (2014). 
128 Id. citing Facts and Trends Regarding USITC Section 337 Investigations at 2 (April 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/press room/documents/featured news/sec337factsupdate.pdf; see also Deanna Tanner Okun & 
Evan H. Langdon, Does the ITC Need eBay?, Bloomberg Law (July 12, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberglaw.com/search/results/11d944fa3e316580d6195e281b5e483a/document/X9R4FTIG000000; 
White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues (June 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/04fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent -issues (casting PAE’s in a negative light and 
calling them patent trolls). 
129 See generally, Irena Royzman, If High Court Reverses Teva, Litigation Costs May Increase, Law 360, (October 
15, 2014, 8:37 p.m.), http://www.law360.com/articles/587384/if-high-court-reverses-teva-litigation-costs-may-
increase (“So-called “patent trolls” – companies that buy up often dubious patents to sue others rather than make 
anything of their own – are part of the problem: Suits filed by patent trolls cost $29 billion in 2011.”). 
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mystery why the number of cases seen through to the end of discovery, let alone a final disposition, 
is as high as it is.  With the amount of importance the Teva decision has put on claim construction 
and the Markman Hearing, parties will be more willing to resolve matters before ever reaching 
trial.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Teva, has created a fork-in-the-road for patent litigation 
moving forward.  Now that more emphasis will be placed on the Markman Hearing, it is 
foreseeable that parties will spend more money early on in a proceeding.  Each party will spend 
more time in preparing their best case, more money analyzing the available intrinsic evidence, and 
more money compiling extrinsic evidence.  However, this additional cost may lead to the end result 
of earlier resolution of patent cases. 
  Some may argue that the Teva decision increases the economic burden on the parties.  At 
first glance this argument has merit.  The heightened standard of review for claim construction 
creates an increased urgency at the Markman Hearing.  Parties now know they will be facing an 
uphill battle if a claim construction ruling goes against them and that entices the parties to do 
whatever they can to emerge victorious, even if it means opening the pocketbooks.  One of the 
major costs associated with the Markman Hearing is the use of expert witnesses.130  The increased 
deferential standard of review will induce litigants to use expert witnesses and the expert testimony 
will have a significant impact on the court’s determination.131  Because these expert witnesses are 
highly sought after and important their services are rather expensive.  So, yes, it is easy to see how 
an increase in the cost of the Markman Hearing would translate to an overall increase in the cost 
of patent litigation.  However, it is not that simple. 
                                                          
130 Mini Kapoor, Teva Will Increase Reliance On Experts In Patent Cases, Law 360, (March 18, 2015, 10:58 a.m.), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/629122/teva-will-increase-reliance-on-experts-in-patent-cases.  
131 Irena Royzman, If High Court Reverses Teva, Litigation Costs May Increase, Law 360, (October 15, 2014, 8:37 
p.m.), http://www.law360.com/articles/587384/if-high-court-reverses-teva-litigation-costs-may-increase.  
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 The cost of expert witnesses pales in comparison to the cost of a full trial and potential 
appeal.  And if the use of these expert witnesses, coupled with the fact of deferential review on 
appeal, leads to a pre-trial disposition of the matter then it is well worth it.  Based on the table 
shown above, mediation of a matter costs one quarter of the amount of a full trial.132  And that cost 
savings only increases as the value of the lawsuit increases.133  The initial increase in cost will 
likely prevent a matter from reaching the time consuming and expensive needs of a trial.  This is 
a logical situation when you analyze the litigation process from its beginning.  Armed with the 
information received throughout the discovery period, the parties engage in a Markman Hearing.  
Here, nothing is kept in reserve for trial and the parties will get a very real sense of their chances 
of success.   
F. Cases After Teva 
 Teva was decided on January 20, 2015.134  In the fourteen months following the Teva 
decision, it has been cited in over 200 decisions.  However, not all of these cases were affected by 
the Teva decision, these cases merely reference Teva when describing the standard of review.  The 
decision has forced courts to focus on what determinations underlie claim constructions.135  Teva 
does not automatically create a heightened standard of review for determinations of claim 
construction.136  The cases that follow illustrate the effect that the Teva decision is having on patent 
litigation. 
 CardSoft, LLC v. Verifone, Inc., et al. 
                                                          
132 See AIPLA, supra note 120. 
133 See Id. 
134 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015). 
135 Shire Dev., LLC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 787 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
136 Id. 
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In CardSoft, a patentee brought suit against a competitor for alleged infringement, the 
district court construed the patent claim construction and found there was infringement.137  The 
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and the Supreme Court vacated and remanded 
the Federal Circuit’s decision in light of the new standard of review established in Teva.138  On 
remand, the Federal Circuit again reversed the district court’s decision “[b]ecause this case does 
not involve the factual findings to which [the court] owe deference under Teva.”139  The court 
opined that the district court’s construction of the claim did not represent the traditional meaning 
of a term as it would be understood by a person familiar with the subject matter.140  
In CardSoft, the court relied on intrinsic evidence to reach its conclusion.  The specification 
and prosecution history of the patent claim clearly indicated that the specific term in question was 
expressly given its conventional meaning.  When a court relies on this type of evidence, its 
construction of the claim is a question of law and will be reviewed de novo.  The patentee should 
have introduced some form of extrinsic evidence to prove an unconventional meaning to the patent 
claim term.  However, that alone would not be enough; the patentee would also need to show 
ambiguity in any intrinsic evidence offered before the court.  
 Butamax™ Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc. 
In Butamax, a patent owner brought suit against a competitor for alleged infringement, the 
district court construed the patent claim construction and denied the patent owner’s summary 
judgment motion of literal infringement.141  The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s 
decision and remanded to the district court for reconsideration pursuant to its claim construction.142  
                                                          
137 CardSoft, (assignment for the Benefit of Creditors), LLC v. VeriFone, Inc., 807 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
138 Id. at 1348. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 1349. 
141 Butamax™ Advanced Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc., 746 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
142 Id. at 1316. 
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The court posited that a claim term had ordinary meaning and the “subsequent extrinsic evidence 
does not clearly express an intent at the time of the invention to redefine” the term.143  The Supreme 
Court vacated and remanded the Federal Circuit’s decision in light of the new standard of review 
established in Teva.144  
 In Butamax, the court examined the patent claim term’s ordinary meaning, the specification 
and claims, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence.  Gevo produced extrinsic evidence, 
which is the first step towards invoking Teva’s clear error review.  However, Gevo did not show 
ambiguity in the intrinsic evidence; therefore, the court did not rely on the extrinsic evidence 
produced.  Here, the litigants are a step closer than the parties in CardSoft to invoking the 
heightened standard of review, but merely introducing evidence extrinsic to the patent is not 
enough.  The court has yet to rule on the remanded case, but based on its original decision’s 
reasoning the outcome will remain the same. 
 Azure Netorks, LLC, et al. v. CSR PLC, et al. 
 In Azure, a patentee and assignor brought an infringement suit against competitors, the 
district court construed the patent claims and entered judgment in favor of the defendants.145  The 
Federal Circuit adopted the patentee’s claim construction, vacated the district court’s decision and 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings pursuant to patentee’s claim construction.146  
The court held that the patent claims used a term consistent with its standard meaning within the 
art,147 but the district court interpreted the term narrowly and not within its customary meaning.148  
                                                          
143 Id. at 1313 (emphasis omitted). 
144 Gevo, Inc. v. Butamax Advanced Biofuels LLC, 135 S. Ct. 1173, 191 L. Ed. 2d 130 (2015). 
145 Azure Networks, LLC v. CSR PLC, 771 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 135 S. Ct. 
1846, 181 L. Ed. 2d 720 (2015). 
146 Id. at 1350. 
147 Id. at 1348. 
148 Id. at 1347. 
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The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Federal Circuit’s decision in light of the new 
standard of review established in Teva.149  
 Here, the patentee claimed that by removing the word ‘control’ from a claim term they had 
altered the meaning of said term.150  Courts have agreed that when a party has become their own 
lexicographer, it is acceptable to modify the traditional meaning of a claim term.151  The 
modification of a term’s customary meaning must be clear when defining that term.  The 
specification must be clear enough to show an ordinarily person skilled in the relevant art that a 
term is being redefined.  The claim term had an ordinary meaning and when read in the context of 
the patent claim, even with the removal of the word ‘control’, the court found that the term still 
had its traditional meaning. 
 However, the specification in the patent claim clearly and continuously provides a 
particular meaning.  The court discounts the district court’s construction of the claim because of 
the customary meaning of a term in the industry, but that term does not appear anywhere in the 
patent claims.  The fact is that the patentee took an ordinary industry term, media access control 
address, and removed the word ‘control’.  That alters the term itself and, it could be argued, 
significantly modifies the meaning of the term as it is used within the patent claims.  While, the 
court has yet to rule on the remanded case, it seems apparent that the decision will remain the 
same.  Although the party’s modification of the term seems to rise to the level of being their own 
lexicographer, the court’s decision was based on intrinsic evidence and therefore should not 
change. 
 Cephalon, Inc. v. Abraxis Bioscience, LLC 
                                                          
149 CSR PLC v. Azure Networks, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 1846, 181 L. Ed. 2d 720 (2015). 
150 Azure, 771 F.3d at 1349. 
151 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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 In Cephalon, the assignee of a patent sued a manufacturer for infringement, the district 
court construed the patent claims and the assignee stipulated to a judgment that there was no 
infringement.152  After reviewing the factual findings that were the basis for the district courts 
claim construction for clear error, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination.153  
The court reviewed the specification, the prosecution history, textbooks, and expert testimony.154  
The court held that the disputed terms were technical words and their meaning to a person of 
ordinary skill in the art is a question of fact that is reviewed for clear error.155  
 When the terms used in the patent claim are technical words, the court often relies on 
experts in the relevant field.  Naturally, opinions can vary from person to person and from court to 
court.  It is completely plausible that the Federal Circuit would have construed the claim 
construction differently than the district court.  However, it is much more difficult to find clear 
error, which was a vital factor in the Federal Circuit affirming the district court’s determination. 
 Enzo Biochem Inc. v. Applera Corp. 
 In Enzo, the patentee filed an infringement suit against a competitor, the district court 
construed the patent claims in favor of patentee, the jury found the patent was infringed upon and 
awarded the patentee over $48 million in damages.156  The Federal Circuit disagreed with the 
district court claim construction, vacated the finding of infringement, and remanded for analysis 
consistent with its opinion.157  The court acknowledged that the district court’s conclusion was 
                                                          
152 Cephalon, Inc. v. Abraxis Bioscience, LLC, 618 F. App’x 663 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
153 Id. at 664. 
154 Id. at 665-6. 
155 Id. at 665. 
156 Enzo Biochem Inc. v. Applera Corp., 780 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
157 See Id. at 1157. 
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based on extrinsic evidence, namely expert testimony.158  However, the court stated that it still had 
the autonomy to review the district court’s determination anew.159  
 The Federal Circuit erred when it did not separately review for clear error any 
determinations made by the district court with regards to factual disputes.  Any resolution of a 
factual dispute, whether ultimate or subsidiary, must be reviewed using the clear error standard.160  
While the court may very well find that clear error did exist in the district courts construction of 
the claim, the de novo review used on appeal was not appropriate. 
Part IV: Conclusion 
 This Note discussed both the ramifications on judicial efficiency and the economic 
concerns, as well as the correlation between the two, following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Teva Pharmaceuticals.  The Supreme Court’s decision placed even greater emphasis on the 
outcome of the Markman Hearing and the determinations of underlying factual disputes in claim 
construction.  This greater emphasis will lead parties to expend more resources, both time and 
money, to emerge victorious following the Markman Hearing.  While some may argue that this 
will only increase the already exorbitant cost of patent litigation, it is actually more likely to reduce 
the overall cost incurred by the parties.  This is accomplished through the chain reaction or domino 
effect of events stemming from the Markman Hearing.  The outcome of the Markman Hearing 
provides a roadmap to the impending trial, which may induce the parties to settle or continue to 
trial.  Either way, the judicial system wins.  Settlement before trial will greatly reduce the cost of 
                                                          
158 See Id. at 1156. 
159 See Id. (“this sole factual finding does not override our analysis of the totality of the specification, which clearly 
indicates that the purpose of this invention was directed towards indirect detection, not direct detection.”). 
160 See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015) (“we recognized that courts may have to 
resolve subsidiary factual disputes.  And, as explained above, the Rule requires appellate courts to review all such 
subsidiary factual findings under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard.”). 
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litigation and even if the parties continue through to trial, it is likely that only tightly contested 
matters will be heard by the court. 
